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Abs tr ac t
T h is pap er i n v est ig a t e sac l a ss of p opu lation-l earni ng dynamic s .I n e v er yp e -
r io d agen ts e ither adopt a b est repl y to the curren td i s t ri bution of a ct ua lp l a y ,o r a
b e s t r e ply t oa s a mpl e, tak e n wi t h repl a c emen t, fr om the di st ri bution of in tend ed
pl a y ( the str ategie s adopted at the end of l a st p eri o d), or they a re in a ct iv e. If s am-
pl in g w i th repl acemen t a n d b e in g i na ct iv eh a v es t ri ctly p ositi v e pro ba bi lit y , these
dynami cs co n v erge global ly to minimal cu rb sets i n the a b sence of m i sta k es. F o r
t w o-pl a y er i ￿ j -games, i ;j ￿ 3 ; t he s ame resul t hol ds ev en if onl y b est resp ond-
in g t o actual p la ya n d b e in g i nactiv eh a v ep o si tiv e probabi li t y . I f pla y ers ma k e
mistak es i n the imp lemen tation o ft he ir strat egi es, t h ese d ynamics sele ct am ong
minimal curb sets.
￿
I wrote the ￿rs t dr a ft of this pap er whi le I en j o y ed t he h o sp i tali t yo fC e n tER. I thank, without
im pli ca ti ng, Sj aak Hurk e ns and Er i cv an Dam m ef or c om m en ts . I ha v ea lso b e ne￿ tted from com m en ts
m a de i n the IO MEG Tw orkshop at t he Univ e rsit yo f I o w a. I am grate f ul to the NSF f or ￿nancial
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1 In tro duc ti on
This pap e rc ha racte rize s the l o ng-run o utc om es of a cl a s so fl earning dynam i cs in g am e s.
The c ha racte riz at i on i s in term s of prop e rtie s o f s ubsets of the sp ace of stra te g y pro ￿l es
of th e u nde rlyi ng ga m es. Y oun g [199 3] has sho wn that u nde r som ec o ndit ion s on pl a y e rs ’
m e m o r y an d t he c om plete ness of the ir inform ation, adaptive pl ay c on v erges a l m os t surel y
to a pu r e strateg y eq ui li brium , pro vi de d the gam e s atis￿es an acyc lic it y req uirem en t.
The presen t pap e ri si n the s am es p i rit. I tl o oks at a di ￿e ren t dynam ic a nd, m ore
im p ortan tly ,i t d r op s t h e ac ycl ic it y conditi on . Without thi s condition, the question
arises wh i c h ob jec ts c a n tak e the pl ac e of the pure strategy Nash e quil ibri a . In general,
one susp ec ts tha t this wil ld e pe nd on d e ta i ls of the dyna m ic . This pap er a rgues that
there are i n tere sting cl a sses of dynam i cs whos e long- run o utcom e s can b e c hara ct eriz ed
in term s of cu r b (c lose d un der r ational b ehav ior ) se ts.
A p ro duct set o f s tr a tegi es is closed under incl us i on of b e s t repli es i fi t con tains all
b est re s p o nses to indep enden tb e l iefs su pp o r ted on i tself. Bas u a nd W eibul l [19 91] w ho
￿rst ex am ined the pro p erti es of suc hs e ts , refer to th e ma s cl ose d unde r r ation al b eh av ior
(curb). Curb sets whic h do not pro p erl yc on ta i n an other curb set a re ref erred t oa s
minimal c urb set s. In generi c norm al fo rm ga m es these coinci de with p er si sten ts e ts (the
ex trem e poi n ts of p ersiste n tr e tra c ts), Kalai a nd Sam e t[ 1 98 4], Balk en b org [19 92]. Whil e
the set o f rati o nali zab l e strategie s, B ernhei m [198 4] a nd P e ar c e [198 4], i sa m ax i m al ￿x ed
p o i n t under the b est repl ym apping, a m i nim al c urb s e ti sam i ni m al ￿x ed p oin t under
this m apping.
Cu rb sets ha v ea n um b er of a ttracti v e features. T he y s hare with stri ct equi li bria the
prop ert y tha t the y con tain a l l b est repli es a gainst them sel v e s. E v e ry curb set con tains the
supp ort of a Nas h equi li br i um ; suc h equi li br i a are re ferre d to as curb equi libri a. B lum e
[199 4] s ho ws that in g am e sw i th one-s i ded pre -p l a yc om m unic at i o n, the m i nim al curb
conditi o n sele cts the com m unicating pla y er’s fa v or i te equi li brium i fi t is no t to o risky .
Hurk ens [ 1 993 ] dem o nstrates that in pre-pla y com m unication ga m es where m e s sag e s are
m ade di st i nct vi a nom i na l m essa ge c o sts, all m ini m al curb eq uili bria are e￿ cie n t for the
com m unic at i ng pl a y ers, if the underl yi n g ga m e has a stric t equi libri um whic hg i v es the2
com m unic at i ng pla y ers their m o st preferre dp a y o￿ .
L i k e s tri ct e quil ibria, curb sets wil l b e lo call y sta bl e under a larg e class of plausibl e
dynam ic adjustm en t rule s . The questi o nIw an t to p o se in this pap e ri s whether it is
p o ssible to pro vi d e a ￿rm e r dynam i c foun dation fo r m inim a l curb se ts . This requi res
that on e address t w oi ss ue s. Are there dynam i cs whic h con v erge g l o ball yt om inim al
c u r b sets? A re there dynam ic s whic hs e le ct a m on g m ini m al curb s e ts?
Hurk ens [199 4] pro v ides one ans w er to the ￿rst q ue stion. He exam i ne sad y na m ic in
the spiri to fY oung [ 1 993 ] wh i c hc o n v e rg e sa l m os t surel yt oam ini m al curb set fro m a n y
ini tial c o ndi tion. In hi sd y na m ic, o nl y on e pa i ro fa g e n ts pl a ys in an yg i v e n tim ep e r i od.
Ea c ho ft h e m tak e s a p ossibly incom pl ete sam ple f ro m ￿ni te le ng th hi s torie s of pas t pl a y
and b est re s p ond s to some distributi on o v e r the sam ple . T he fact that only the supp ort
of the sa m ple m atters, g uaran tees tha t ev ery b eli ef o v e r strategie s in the curren t state
is p ossible . There fo re the dynam i cw i ll e v e n tually l ea v ea n ys e t of s trategie s that i s not
curb. F inite length histo ri es gu aran tee th at once the pro c ess has s p en t su￿c ie n t tim e
in a m i nim a l c u rb set it can not exi t the m i nim a l curb set a n y m ore. Hurk ens s ho ws that
his dyna m ic con v erges gl o ball yt o m ini m al curb se ts , alm o st s ure ly . He then g o es on
to ask wh e ther a ddi ng m uta ti on s t o h i s dynam i c yie lds s e lec tion am ong m ini m a l curb
sets. This is no t the ca se b ec a use as so on a s a m istak ee n te rs the c urren t state, i ti s
p o ssible that th e acti v ep l a y e rs attribute any probab i li t y to the corresp o ndi ng st r a tegy .
Therefore o ne m i sta k e is su￿c ien t to upset a n ym inim al c u rb set i nH ur k ens’ fram ew o rk.
Iw an tt o p r o p o s ead i ￿e ren t dynam i c. Ic o nsi de r larg e p opulations of a gen ts . All
ag e n ts pl a yi ne v ery p e rio d; when they pla y ,t he y us e the strategies they had adop te d at
the e nd o f last p e rio d, unl ess they are exp eri m en ting. If t he y are e xp erim en ti ng , the y
rand om i ze ,c ho osing eac h of thei ra v ai lable strategies with stri ctly p ositiv e proba bi li t y .
Agen ts di ￿e ri nh o wt h e y pro ce ss i nfo rm at i o n. In eac h p eri od e v ery agen te ither b est
r esp onds,o rgathe r s inform ation or i s inact ive. Be s t resp o nding ag e n ts l earn the true
curre n td i stribution of p l a y fro m pl a ying aga i ns t the en ti re p opu l ation. Agen ts w ho
ga ther inform ation sam ple (with replace m en t) from the distri bution o f stra te gi es ag e n ts
had a dopted a t the e nd o f last p eri od . Ei ther o f these acti v ea g e n t g roups a dopt a3
b est reply a gainst thei r inform ation.
1
Inacti v e a gen ts c a rry o v e r the strateg y they had
ado pted a t the end o f last p eri od i n to the ne xt p eri od . B ecause p l a y pa rtne rs are
ide n ti￿able , the i nfo rm at i on a v ail ab l e to b est resp o nders i sm od e lle da sc om ing from
sa m pli n g without replace m en t and fo r si m pli cit ya s l earning t h e true distributi on o f
pla y , where a s inform ation gathering is p oten ti al ly i nd i rec t and the refore m od e ll ed as
sa m pli n g with replace m en t.
I deri v et w om ai nr e su l ts; one under the cond i tion tha t the m i sta k e pro babil it yi s
ze ro a nd one fo r p ositi v e but sm all m i sta k e probab i li tie s . Without m ista k es the dynam i c
con v erges to m inim al c ur b sets regardless of the ini tial cond i tion. With m istak es the
dynam ic sele cts am ong m inim a l curb sets. F or t w o -pla y er gam es with t w o exhaus ti v e
m i nim al c urb sets, I c hara c teriz e the conditi on f o r se lec tion o f one o f the m inim a l curb
sets; this c o nditi o n reduce st oH a rsan yi-Sel ten risk do m ina nc ei n 2 ￿ 2 gam es. I n tuiti v e ly ,
the t w o sets of sta te s where the p o pul at i o ns pla ye n tirel ya c cording to o ne of the t w o
m i nim a l curb sets (minimal c ur b states set s) a re exce ptiona l . The dy na m i cc an l ea v e
these sets of states only i f su￿ci en tl ym an ym istak e so c cur si m ul ta neously .A n y other
sta te , o utsi de of these sets, b el o ngs to the ba si n s of attraction of b oth m i nim a l curb state
sets. Th us all that m a tte rs is ho wm an ym i s tak es i t tak es to upset ei th e r one o f the t w o
m i nim al c urb state s e ts.
Ia l so in v e st i ga te to w hat exte n tw e need sa m pli n g with replace m en t or a s in Hurk ens
[199 4] a direc t a ssum ption tha t e v e ry distributi o n whic h is sup p orted o n the c urren t state
has p ositi v e proba bi li t y . I sh o w tha t w em a yb ea b l e to do without suc h ass um ptions .
A tl e a s ti nt w o-pla y er i ￿ j -ga m es with i; j ￿ 3 a sim ple b e st -r e ply rule where a gen ts are
ei ther i n acti v eo rm o v e to o ne of thei r b est repli es, con v erges globa l ly to m i nim a l curb
sets a l m os t surel y .
Be si des the prob l em of ￿ndi n g dyna m ics w hi c hl e a d to an d sele ct a m on g m inim al
curb sets i n a gam e, there i s the dua l proble mo f w h e ni ti s p o ssibl e to ￿nd sim ple c h ar-
acteri zations o f s t a ble sets of a dynam i ci n term s o f the ga m e. F or a M ar k o v pro cess
with sta ti o nary tra nsiti on prob abil iti es t h e stable sets are the rec u rre n t com m un i cation
1
F or te c hnical re a s ons I wil lh a v et o w ork wi t h alm o s t bes t r ep l ies or res trict the anal ys i s to a gene ric
class of g am es .4
cl a sses of the pro c ess . As Y oun g [ 19 93 ] has sh o wn, o ne can sel ect a m o ng the recurre n t
com m unic at i on c lass e sb yc o nsi de ring li m i ts o f p e rturb ed pro cesses as the p erturbation
v an i shes. The l im iting di s tri bution wil lh a v ei ts sup p ort concen tra te d on the c om m u-
nic a ti on c l a sses w i th t he l east sto c has ti c p oten tial. In g e neral, it will b e di￿ cult to
c ha racte rize the se c om m unic at i on cl a sses in term s o f the underly ing gam e. T he prese n t
pap er p r opos e s a c l a ss of dynam i cs for wh i c hs u c hac haracteri zation is p o ssibl e; fo r th e se
dynam ic s the recurre n tc o m m un i cation c las ses o f the u np erturb ed d y na m ic corresp ond
to the m i nim a l curb sets of the underl ying ga m e. T he corresp ondence is as fo l lo ws: for
a giv en rec urren t com m unic at i on c l as s t he re is exactl y o ne m inim a l curb se t suc h that
eac h sta te has su pp o r to n l yo nt h i sm i nim a l curb s e t; con v ersel y ,g i v en a n ym inim al
curb set, ev ery s tate w i th sup p ort on this m i nim al curb set b el o ngs to o ne a nd the sa m e
rec urren t com m un i cation cl a ss. F urtherm ore, fo r a no n-triv ial c lass o f g am e s o ne can de-
riv e su￿ci en tc o nditi on s for the sel ec tion of a particul ar m i nim al c urb set vi a p erturb ed
dynam ic s. I n tere stingly ,i t turns out, that the pa y o ￿s in the e quil ibri ab e long i n g to the
m i nim a l c u rb sets pl a y a seconda ry role as far a s s e le ction is c on c erned. Supp o se one
sta rts wit h a stric t equi li br i um that is sel ecte db y the p erturb ed dynam ic .I f o ne then
repl a c es thi se q ui li brium with a g am e that i sam inim al c urb set in th e ne wl yf o r m ed
ga m e and has a uniq ue e quil ibrium with the sam ep a y o￿s a s the origi na l e q ui li brium ,
this m i nim al c u rb set nee d not b e sel ecte db yt h e p erturb ed dynam ic .
Th e pap e ri s orga ni zed a s fo l lo ws. The nex t sec tion desc rib es the m o del . Sec tion 3
in tro duces th e dynam i c without m uta t ion s a nd de riv es the g l o bal co n v e rg e nce to m in-
im al c urb sets. Secti on 4 i n tro duces m istak e s in the i m pl em e n ta ti on o f stra t eg i es and
dem o nstrates that the dynam i cs e lec ts am ong exhaus t iv em ini m al curb sets in t w o-p l a y er
gam es. Se ction 5 concl ud e s.
2 The Setup
Co nsi de r a ￿ni te set of p o pulations P wi th t ypi cal e lem en t p 2 P: Denote the siz eo f
p o pulati on p b y N
p
: Eac h p o pulation corresp onds to one of the pl a y e rs in the ga m e
G = fS; ug:S
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with t ypic al
e l e m e n t s 2 S; and u
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is a t ype p pla y er’ s util it y functi on ; u
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: S ! < : Let ￿
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: At y pical e lem en to f￿ w i l lb e





e xtends to ￿ in the us ual w a y .
F or an y ￿ni te set X; l et ￿(X ) sta nd for th e s e t o f proba bi lit y distri b uti on s o v er
X: Let BR
p







) : I wil l also use the na tural ex tension o f BR ( ￿ ) to sets of s trategie sa s
a r g u m e n ts.
Basu a nd W e ibull [ 1 991 ] in tro duced th e notion of cu r b (cl os e d under r ation al b eh av ior )








; i s closed under i nclusi o n of b est
repl ies (curb) if e ac h Q
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If a curb s e ts do e s no t pro p erl yc on ta i n ano the r curb s e t, it is call ed m inim al . The strate-
gies whic h form a m i ni m al c urb s e t a re call ed curb strateg i es, and equil ibri ab e l o nging
to m ini m al curb s e ts are curb equi li bria.
Bl um e[ 19 94 ] and Hurk ens [199 3] sho w that the c urb equi li br i um re quire m en t sele cts
e￿ cie n t outcom e si n g a m es w i th pre -p l a yc om m unic at i on . B lum e considers g am e sw i th
costle ss m essag e s; H urk e ns ana l yze s the c a se of nom i na l m essa ge costs . Cons i der the t w o
ga m es b elo w. B ot h ga m e sh a v et w om i nim al curb sets corresp o ndi ng to the t w o stri ct
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b efore pl ay ing t he ga m e,

















LL LR RL RR
3,3 3 , 3 0 , 0 0,0
0,0 0, 0 1, 1 1,1
3,3 0, 0 3, 3 0,0















LL LR RL RR
9 , 9 9,9 0,8 0,8
8, 0 8,0 7,7 7,7
9, 9 0,8 9,9 0,8
8 , 0 7,7 8,0 7,7
￿
2
If m e s sag e s are cos tl ess, then Bl um e [199 4] sho w s tha t all c ur be q uili bria in ￿
1
supp ort
thee ￿ cie n t pay o￿ pa i r( 3 ; 3): This result g e neraliz es p ro v ided a conditi o n that trades
o￿ the risk o f the e￿ cie n t equi libri um in the un de rlyi ng ag ainst th e si ze of the m e ss age
spa c e is s atis￿ed. In ￿
2
whi c h is ba sed on G
2
; all e quil ibri a are curb equil ibri a b ecause
there i s a tension b e t w ee nr i sk do m inan c ea n dP areto do m inan c e in the underl ying
ga m e. I fm ess ages carry a no m inal c o st whic hd i stingu i shes them , these re su l ts can







; U )g ￿ f L L; LRg i s the uni que m ini m al curb set in b oth of the a b o v e
com m unic at i o n ga m es. He sho ws that th i sr e su l tg e nera l iz es to n-p l a y er g am e s in whic h
a subset o f the pl a y er set can s e nd a m essa ge.
3 Dyn am ics
In this secti on I d e sc rib e the le a rni n g dynam i c, and c ha racte rize its lon g-run ou tc om es
in the abs e nc eo fe x pe rim e n tation. I wil l sho w that the pro c ess con v erges a l m os t surel y
to a curb s e t, regardless o f the i ni tial p o pul at i o n sta te .I n the f ol lo wing se ction I will
ex am ine thi s pro ce s s furthe r under the co ndi tion tha t the e xp e rim e n tation pro babil it y
is di￿ere n t fro m z ero.






: The s tate of






: I n p erio d t state !
t￿1
is repl ac ed
b y !
t
ac cording to th e f ol lo wing ru l e. Agen t i e n ters p e rio d t with pure s t ra te gy s
i;t ￿ 1
:7
Ev e ry agen ti n p pl a ys ag ainst al l agen ts i n P np: Whe n she pl a ys in p e rio d t,a na g e n t uses
stra te gy s
i;t￿1
; unle ss she ex pe r im e n ts (o r m ak es a m ista k e). E ac h agen te xp e rim e n ts
with proba bi li t y ￿ ￿ 0; i n that case she c ho os e se a c h of her pure strategie sw i th s tri ctl y
p o siti v e pro babili t y . There a re thre e di￿eren tw a ys i nw h i c ha g e n ts pro cess inform ation
in p e rio d t and there b y gene ra te the n e w sta te s
t
: With p robabili t y ￿
1
an a gen t ado pts
a b est re ply ag ainst th e c urren t distributi o n o f actual p l a yi np e rio d t; with pro babil it y
￿
2
she ga the rs inform ation abou t t h e stra te gi es that w ere ad opted last p eri od , a n d w i th






she i si n acti v ei np e rio d t: Subsequen t l yIw i ll refe rt oa g e n ts
in these v arious ro l es a s, b est resp o nding, i nfo rm at i o n ga the ring a nd inacti v ep l a y e rs .
Ab e st resp o ndi ng a gen tm e ets all ag e n ts from p opulations she do es not b el o n gt oa n d
le a rns t h e true distributi o n o f curren t pla y( i ncludi ng m istak e s ) in the c ur ren t p eri od i n
thos e p opulations; she then ado pts a b e st reply a gainst this distri bu t ion . A n inform ation
ga ther ing agen t tak e sa s a m pl e (with repl ac em e n t) fro m the s t ra te gi es th at w ere a dopted
in p e rio d t ￿ 1 (the in te nded pl a yo f p e rio d t); s he then a dopts an ￿-b est re ply a gainst
uncorrel a te db e li efs based on thi ss a m ple. A na g e n t who i s inacti v ei np e rio d t pa sses
throu gh tha t p erio d wi th out c hang i ng her strategy .
Pla y with m i s tak es in p er io d t generates a tem p orary s tate ~ !
t
to whic h b est resp onding
pla y ers b est re s p on d a t th e end of p eri od t . Note tha t f or e ac ha g e n ti 2 peac h pa rti al
tem p orary state ~ !
￿ p ;t









￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
# ( P )






; whic h itsel fc an be
ide n ti￿e d with an el em e n to f￿
￿ p
=￿
q 6 = p
￿
q
:Thi sb e l ie f is based on the observ ed rel at i v e
freq uenci es of strategies in th e p o pul at i o ns not i ncl ud i ng i: With this i den ti ￿cation of





) : F or t he rem ainde ro ft h i s secti o n I will se t the exp eri m en ta ti o n pro babil it y
to z ero; I return to the c as e o f ￿> 0i n t he ne xt secti on .
De no te the p erio d t sa m ple from p opulation p obta i ned b y a n inform ation gathering
ag e n t i= 2 p b y X
i pt





p2 P; p 6 3 i
Li k e






); the set of ag e n t i’ s pure ￿-b est repl ies ag ainst uncorrel at e db e lie fs ba sed on8
the sa m pl e X
i t
: A ni nfo rm at i o n g atheri ng a gen t i ado pts one o f these ￿-b e st repl ie s;
2
in
case ofi ndi￿erence , she rando m ize , putting stric tly p ositiv e pro babil it y on eac ho ft h e





): Le ts a m ple s i zes b e tim ei n v ar i an t an d deno te the si z e of pl a y er
i’ s sam ple f ro m p o pul at i on p; i 62 p; b y N
i p
:
Th e dynam i c pro c ess descri b ed here is a Mark o vc ha i n with stationa r y trans i tion
prob abil iti es on the sta te spa c e, d e no te db y￿ : The ￿rs t ob jecti v eo ft h i sp a p e r i st o
c ha racte rize the re curren t com m unic at i on c l a sses of this Mark o vc ha i n. The recurre n t
com m unic at i on c l a sses a re s ubsets o f ￿ suc h tha t (i ) fro m ev e ry sta te the re is a ￿ni te
le ng th seque nce of p ositi v e probab i li t y transiti o n st o a tl e as t o ne of t h e s e class e s, (ii )
withi n eac hc l as s ev ery sta te can b e re ac hed from e v e ry other sta te vi a a ￿nite length
seque nc e of p ositi v e p robab i li t yt r a nsiti o ns, and (ii i) no state outside one of the cl a sses
can b e re ac hed fro m a sta te i nside throu gh a p o sit iv e pro babil it y transiti on . Sinc e
(m i nim al )c urb se ts wil l ￿gure pro m inen tly i n thi sc hara c teriz at i o n, de￿ne a set o f states
supp orted en ti rel y o n one (m i nim al) c urb set ,a n d i ncludi ng all suc h states a s a (m ini m al-
)curb-sta te se t.
L e t




g 8 ￿ ￿ S:
F or an y subs e t ￿ of the set o f pure stra te g y pro￿les, this is the set of all m ixe d strategy
pro￿ l es o r eq uiv alen tly uncorrel at e db e l ie fs with supp ort in ￿: F or a n ys u c h ￿ one can
de￿ne the set
V (￿) := ￿ [ BR (￿(￿)) 8 ￿ ￿ S
consisting of the union of ￿ an d a l lb e s t repl ies aga i ns t uncorrelated b e li efs c o nce n trated
on ￿: Le t V
t
de no te the t-fo l d iterati on o f V: It i se a sil y seen that, sta rti ng with a set ￿
2
I use ￿-b es t re pl ies b ec ause the s am pli ng pr oc es s only a ll o ws o ne to appro xi m ate th e s et of p oss i ble
bel iefs o v e rag iv en sup p ort of st rategi e s. Altern a tiv ely one coul dp r o c e e dl ik e Hurk e ns and a rg ue di re ct l y
in te rm s of s upp orts ; i. e. o n e co uld s i m ply p ostu l ate an up da ti ng r ul e in whic hp l a y ers c an m o v et oa n y
st rategy whic hi s a b es t r eply to som e b eli ef so v er a gi v e n s upp ort. Also, i n a gene ric cla ss o fg am es ,
w ec a nr e p l ac e ￿-b es t repli es b y b es t repli e s in our dynam i c. T h e gene ri c prop er t yt o l oo k f o r is that
an y s trate g y that is a w e ak b e st r eply t o s o m e bel iefs c oncen t rated on supp ort Q; i sas t r i ct bes t r ep l y
aga inst s o m e bel iefs c o n cen t rated on Q as w el l.9
one reac hes a ￿xe d p oin to fV b yi terating V su￿ci en tl yo f t en.
Le m m a1 8 ￿ ￿ S; 9T :( 8 t>T ; V
t + 1
( ￿) = V
t
(￿)):




i s m o n o t on i c a nd 2
S
is ￿n i te. 2
W e nex t need notation to d e scrib e the ￿xed p oin t that i s reac hed i f one starts the
ite ra ti on with the supp ort ￿(￿ ) of a stra te g y pro￿le ￿ :
Le t
￿ ( ￿ ) : = f s 2 S j s
i
2 s u p p ( ￿
i
) g
t ( ￿) := m i nft 2 Nj V
t +1
(￿( ￿ )) = V
t
(￿( ￿ ))g
W (￿ ) := V
t(￿ )
(￿(￿ ))
t(￿ ) is the m ini m al n um be ro f p e rio d s neede d b efore one reac hes the ￿xed p o i n t from
￿(￿ ); a nd W (￿ ) i s the ￿x ed p oin tr e ac hed fro m ￿ .
Le m m a2 W ( ￿ ) c ontains a minimal curb set for a ll ￿ 2 ￿ :
P r o of: W (￿ )i sc los e d under i nclusion o f b est repli es. 2
Th e set of states ￿ c a n b e iden ti￿ed w i th a ￿nite sub se t o f the se to f m i xed strategie s.
The dynam ic s ca n b e desc rib ed b y a tran si tion pro babil it y ￿(￿j￿) suc h tha t 8 ￿ ;￿ 2 ￿ ;
￿ ( ￿ j ￿ )d e no te s the proba bi li t yt h at the system will b e i n state ￿ in p eri od t +1 ; i f
in p eri od t it i s in state ￿ :￿ dep ends on p opulation size s , sam ple s i ze sa n d￿: Let







p2P; i = 2 p
gg: Let ￿
￿; N
b e the tran si tion proba bi li t y as a func tion of ￿
and N :
Th e s e t ￿ do e s not con ta i n s tates corresp o ndi n g to e v e ry b e li ef. There fo r e it is p o ssibl e
that ou r dynam ic with b e s t repli es, i nstead o f ￿-b est repl ie s , do es not l ea v eag i v en set
of states ev en tho ugh that s e ti sn o ta c u rb-sta t es e t. T he foll o wing gam e pro vi des an













1,1 1, 0 0, b
1,0 1, a 0, b
0,0 0, 0. 1, .1
where a =
p











) f or m s a m i nim al curb set. Ho w ev er








g i s closed under i nc lusion of b e s t repli es a gainst b e li efs
for w hi c he ac h pro babili t ym ust b e a rationa l n um b er. Only i f th e colum n pla y er puts
prob abil it y b o n the ￿rst s trategy of h e r o pp o nen ti sh e rt h i rd s trategy a b est repl y
ag ainst b e lie fs c o nc en trated o n the ￿rst t w o strategie so f h e r o pp o nen t.
On the other hand, w i th su￿ci en tl yl a rge sam pl e siz es a n y b eli ef c a n b e a ppro xi m ated
arbitraril y c los e ly . Therefore, with ￿ - b est re plie s there is a c ha nc e that our dynam i c
ev en tu al ly l ea v es ev ery set that is not a curb-sta te set.
3
This m o ti v at e s the nex tl e m m a
w h i c h s a y s t hat ev ery b est repl yt oa g i v en b eli ef i sa n ￿ -b e st reply t o a n ope n n e i gh -
bor h o o d of that b el ie f. Th us, i fw e can a ppro xi m ate b eli efs arb i traril y closel y , the set
of b est re pl ie st oa n y pro du c t set o f stra te gi es i s a sub se t of the set of ￿ - b est repli es to
the ￿nite appro xi m ation of the sa m e set, p ro v ided the appro xim at i o n is su￿ci en tl yc l o se.









( ~ ￿ ) :












































In a gene ric class of g am es th i sp r o blem do es n o t arise .11




( ￿ ) : 2
F o r a n yg i v e n ￿ 2￿￿￿ ;￿
￿; N
i n d u c es a p robabili t yd i stribution o v e r the set 2
S
of
supp orts. This i s the prob abil it y th at next p e rio d’ s state wi ll ha v e a cert ai n supp ort
giv en tha t the c ur ren t sta te is ￿ : Let the pro babil it y o f supp ort ￿ 2 2
S
giv en the curre n t




(￿j￿ ); giv en the transiti o n proba bi li t y ￿
￿;N










(￿j ￿ ): Let N
m in
: =m i n f N
ip
g
i2I; p 2 P
:
Ac e n tral c ha racteri stic of ou r l earning r ul ei s that fro m a n y s tate ￿ th e re is p o siti v e
prob abil it y tha t ne xt p e rio d’ s state wil lh a v e su p por t V (￿(￿ )): Ite ra ti ng thi s argu m en t,
one m a y concl ude that from a n y ￿ there is p os i tiv e p robab i li t y tha t a fte r a ￿nite n um be r
of p eri o ds the state h as a s upp o rt whic hi sa ￿ x ed p oin to f V ( ￿ ) :Thi s is the con ten to f
the foll o wi ng l em m a.




> 0 ; t hen 8 ￿ > 0 ; 9
￿








(W (￿ )j ￿ ) > 0; 8 ￿ 2 ￿ :
Pro of: Let ￿(￿ ) b e the set of p ossible s am pl es w i th replace m en t, giv en the c urren t state
￿ : : Gi v en the i den ti ￿cation of s am pl es wi th b el iefs, ￿(￿ ) is a ￿nite appro xi m at ion of





( ￿ ( ￿(￿ ))) b e the (￿nite ) set o f (pure) b e s t repl ies b y a gen t i to the b e li efs




(￿(￿(￿ ))); c ho ose ￿ (s
i





( ￿ ( s
i











(￿(￿(￿ ))); 9 ~ ￿ (s
i
) 2 ￿(￿ ) suc ht h a tj ￿ ( s
i
) ￿ ~ ￿ ( s
i
) j <￿ :T o see thi s note tha t the re





that e ac hs i ng l e ￿ (s
i
) can b e app ro x im ated b yab e lie fi n￿ ( ￿ ) :
By Lem m a3 8 ￿ ; 8 ￿ ( s
i
) ; 9 ￿> 0: j ￿ ( s
i





( ￿ ) : Si nce the re
are ￿n i tel ym an ys u c h￿ ( s
i
) to cons i der a c ro ss a l l indi viduals a nd a l l s up por ts , w e can









( ￿ ) :










(￿(￿( ￿ ))); 9 ~ ￿ (s
i





(~ ￿ ( s
i
)): Sinc e all12




(￿(￿ (￿ (t )))) has p o siti v e
prob abil it yo fb e ing i n the supp ort o f ￿ (t + 1); b ec a use ￿
3
> 0; a n y s
i
2 ￿(￿ (t)); also
has p o siti v e p robabili t yo fb e ing i n the supp ort of ￿ (t +1 ) :
S i n c e N
p
> # ( S
p
) ; w i t h pos i tiv e pro babil it y all the s trategie si nV (￿(￿ (t))) are









(V (￿(￿ ))j￿ ) > 0; 8 ￿ 2 ￿: The conclusion fo l lo ws b y app l yi ng this last o bserv ation
rep eatedl y a nd com bi ning i tw i th Lem m a1 . 2
Acc o rdi ng to the l em m at h e re e xi s ts an upp er b o und on the m i ni m al n um b er o f p osi-
tiv e proba bil it y tra nsit ion s it tak e s from a n y initi al s tate to re ac h a sta te whic h\ c o v ers"
ac u rb set. A t tha t p oin t the re exi s ts a p ositi v e proba bi li t y tra nsi tion i n t oam inim al
curb set.












N ; fr om any
initial state ￿ 2 ￿ ; the system move s in to a min i mal -c ur b -state se t after no mo r e than
T
0
it er ations with p ositive pr ob abil ity.
Pro of: F ro m the prop ositi on , af ter T st eps the system re ac hes a sta te w hose supp ort
\incl udes" a m inim a l curb set. There is p os i tiv e proba bi li t y that i n the nex t ro und all
ag e n ts are activ e and dra ws a m pl es fro m the c urb set. Let T
0
= T + 1 : 2
Th e foll o wi ng le m m av eri ￿es that if, for a giv en ga m e, ￿ i sc hosen su￿c ien tly sm all,
then the le a rni ng dy na m i cc a nnot ex i tam i nim al -c urb- state c urb s e t once i t has en te red
it.
Le m m a5 9 ￿ ￿ > 0: 8 0 <￿<￿ ￿ ; if ￿ (t) is a n el emen t of a curb- state se t ￿; the n
supp ( ￿ (t + k )) ￿ ￿; 8 k ￿ 0




(￿); th e n there exi sts ￿ ￿(s
i








(￿): Co nside r￿ ￿ := m inf￿ ￿ (s
i




(￿); ￿ ￿ S g: 2
W e are no w ready to state the m ain result o f this sec tion. I fp l a y ers us e alm ost b est
repl i e s an d s am pl e size s are su￿c ie n tly l a rge, the n regardless of the initi al c o ndi tions ,13
the le a rni ng pro c ess wil le v en tu al ly end up i n one of th e m ini m al-curb-s t a te sets.




> 0 ; t hen, 9￿ ￿>0 ;such that 8 0 <￿<￿ ￿ ; 9
￿





N; and for any init i al state ￿ 2 ￿; the l e ar nin g pr o c ess c onv er g es almost su r ely
to a minimal- curb- state set.




b e giv en as i n Coro l lary 1 suc h that
P
￿;N
(￿ (t + T
0




(￿ (t + kT
0
) 62 m inim al -curb- state setj￿ (t)= ￿ )￿ (1 ￿ ￿ )
k
:
Th us the pro babil it y tha t the sy st e m do es not con v e rg e to a m i nim al-curb-sta te set
eq u al s
lim
k !1




Not only do es the l earning dynam i cc on v erge g l ob all ya l m os t surely to one of the
m i nim al -c urb -state sets. Inside s uc h sets e v e ry state i s reac he d fro m ev ery oth e r state
vi a a ￿nite le n gth seque nce of p o siti v e pro babil it y trans i tions. Thi s fol lo ws fro m le m m a
4. There fo re w eh a v e the foll o wing c o roll ar y :




> 0 ; then , 9￿ ￿>0 ; suc h that 8 0 <￿ < ￿ ￿; 9
￿





N; th e minimal- curb- state sets ar e the r e cu r r en t c o mmun ic a ti o n c lasses of the
le arnin g dynamic .
3.1 AS i m pl eB e st-R epl y Rul e
In som ei n te resting cl a sses o f g am es one obta i ns co n v e rg e nce to m i nim al -c ur b -state sets
from a sim ple b est-repl y rul e.
4
Cons i der a dynam ic in w hi c h agen ts are e ither inactiv e,
4
Aga in, in ge neral w eh a v et o c o ns i de r ￿ - b es t re pl ies , and l arge p opul atio ns . I w i ll l arge l y igno re
the se de tai ls as i ti se a sy f or the reade r to ￿ll th em in wher e nee ded.14
with pro babil it y1 ￿ ￿; or m o v e to a b est re ply ,w i th proba bi lit y ￿; 0 <￿ <1 : One can
easil yc hec k that this p ro cess con v erges alm o st surel y to the unique m i nim al-c u rb-state
set in the pre-pla yc o m m un i cation gam e with re du c ed no rm al f or m ￿
1
: I nt hi sc a se the re
is no ne ed to i n tro duc e sam pli ng w i th re placem en tt o g e ne ra te a ri c h eno ugh set o f b e li efs
out of the curren t state.
It i se a s yt os e e tha t thi s observ ation g ene ra l iz es fo r thi sc las s of com m un i cation
ga m es. H o w ev er, it i sn o t c l ear ho w far o ne can ex tend i tb e y o nd thi s class. In this
subs e ction I w i ll s ho w tha t the o bserv ation is v al id fo r all t w o -pla y er i ￿ j - gam es w i th
i; j ￿ 3: In this cl a s so fg a m es it is su￿ci en t that s om e agen ts m o v et o ab e st r e pl y whil e
others d on’t to g e nerate b e li efs w hi c hw i ll i ndu c ee x it from an y pro duct set, that do es
not c on t ai na m ini m al curb set.
F or tec hnical re a sons I wil la g a i nr eplace b est re plie s in the dy na m i cb y ￿ -b e st repli es
and refer to the \￿-b est- re ply rule. " In the pro ofs I w i ll arg ue in te rm s of b est re pl ie s.
This su￿ce s fo r gene ric gam es; th e arg um e n ts for g e neral ga m es in te rm so f￿ -b e s t repli es
are a nalogo us to the o ne sm ad e a b o v e an d there fo re om i tted. There are t w o p opulations ,
p=1,2.
Prop osit ion 2 L et G b ea n y i ￿ j - game with i ;j ￿ 3 : Then , f or al l 0 <￿<1 ; the r e
ex ists ￿ ￿ ; such that for al l 0 <￿ <￿ ￿ th er e e xists
￿




N impl i e s that unde r
the ￿-b est -r epl y r u le the pr o c es s wil l almost sur el y c onve r ge to a minimal- curb- state set.
Pro of: Note th at fro m an y s tate there is p ositiv e pro babil it y that i n one step the pro cess
m o v es to a s tate suc h that wi thin eac h p opulation a l la g e n ts use the sa m e stra te gy .I f
one of th e se strategie si s am ini m al curb strategy ,w e are done, b e caus e ther ei s p o siti v e
prob abil it y tha t only the other p o pul at i on m o v es an d that w i thin that p op ul at i on e v e ry
ag e n tm o v e st oa b e s t repl y .T h e refore con ti n ue un de r the ass um ption that w e s tart w i th
a sta te i nw h i c he v ery m em b e ro fap o p u l at i o n us e s the sam e stra te g y wh i c h is not a
m i nim al c urb strategy .




) is not curb, the dy na m i c pro ce s s exi ts thi s state w i th
p o siti v e prob abil it y , a nd m o v e s to a state i n whic h o ne p opulation is c on c en trated on15













) w a s o ne of the











curb,w h i c hm eans tha t ei ther s
3
is a b est re ply to t
1
; in w hi c h cas e w e a re don e b ecause
there a re o nl y three s trategie s a nd one of them has to b e c u rb, o r the re ex ist b e li efs




gs u c h tha t th e colum np l a y e r ha s a b est repl y whic hi sn o tt
1
;













w ou l dh a v et o b ea c urb stra te gy . Sup p os e no t,
i. e. let t
2
b e the o nl y b est reply and le t it no t b e a curb stra te gy . Note that from






















g ; t he re is
ac o rre spo nd i ng state w hi c h can b e re ac hed with p ositi v e proba bi li t y .






; an d t
2
i sac u rb stra te gy .A nd sinc e there i sn ob e lie f




g to wh i c h t
3
is a b e st re ply ,i tm ust b e the case tha t s
3
is a b est replyt os o m e




g: Su ppos e w e a r e at a pos i tiv e proba bi li t y state where the di stribution




g i s suc h that s
3
is a b est repl y .A t tha t p o i n t there i s pos i tiv e pro babil it y
that the en ti re ro w p opu l ation m o v es to s
3
whic h from t h e forego i ng m ust b e a curb
stra te gy . 2
Th e re is stil l the question o f whethe ri ti sp o s s i ble that the dy na m ics m a y end up
b eing con￿ned to a subs e to fam i nim al-curb-sta t e set. Ideall yw ew ould w an t to sho w
that the re curren t com m unic at i on c lass e s o f the ￿ - b est re pl yd y na m ic coinci de with the
m i nim al -c urb -state s e ts. I w i ll pro v e a som ewhat w ea k er re su l t.
Prop osit ion 3 L et G b e any two-pl ay er i ￿ j - game with i ;j ￿ 3 .T he n, fo ra l l 0 <￿<1 ;
t he r ee x ists ￿ ￿; suc h t ha t for al l 0 <￿ < ￿ ￿ t her e e xists
￿




N th ef o l lowin g




of G; ev er y q 2 Q
i
; and ev ery r e cu r r en t
c ommunic ation cl ass C supp orte do n Q; the r ei sa t l e ast one state i n C in whic h q has
p ositiv e weig ht.16
Pro of: Ob vi ou s for 1 ￿ j; j =1 ; 2 ; 3 ; m i ni m al curb sets.













) : A lso wl og
s
2




g t o w hic h t
2
is a b est re ply .
The resul tf o r 2 ￿ 2m inim a l curb sets foll o ws b ec a use w e can m o v ea n y fra c tion o f the
p o pulati o n to a b est repl y .










g : Wi tho ut loss of










i s a b est re ply .
Sup p os e ￿rst tha t s
2
is a b est r eply to t
1
. T he n the dynam i c ca n generate a l l p o ssibl e




g . Sinc ew e are d e al ing with a m i ni m al curb set,




concen tra te d on this s e t suc h that t
j
2 BR ( ￿
j
) ;j =2 ; 3 :
No w supp ose i n ste a d that s
2
i s no t a b est re pl yt ot
1




a re b oth b est
repl ies to s
1






g a nd the re wi ll b e
at l east one distri b uti on o v er these three strategies whic hm ak es s
2
a b est reply .
It rem a i ns to consider the c a se where o nl y t
2
i s a b est replyt o s
1
:I n t h a t c a s es
2
m u s t b e a b est reply to t
2






g w ouldf o r mam ini m al curb set.
This is a nalog ous to the cas e w he re s
2
w a s a b est reply to t
1
:












g : As b e fo r e, wlog ,





) : Al so , w l og , s
2
is a b est repl yt ot
1
, whic hm eans tha t w e can m o v et o a n yb e lie f


















whic hm ak es the m
b est re pli es.
Th e refore supp o se th at s
3
is n ot a b est re ply to t
1









g suc h that t
j
2 BR ( ￿
j













g corresp o nding to
the b el ief ￿
j
;j =2 ; 3 with the l east w ei gh to ns
2
; sa y ￿
2
: Then, si m ul ta ne o usly m o v e
the ro w p op ul at i on to ￿
3
an d the desire df r a cti on of th e c ol um n p opulation to t
2
: In the
next step m o v e the desire d fraction of the c ol um n p o pul at i on t o t
3
: A g ain w e a re done17







S u p p o s e next that only for t
2
there i sab e l ie f ￿
2




g ￿ f t
1
gs u c hthat
t
2
2 BR ( ￿
2
) : Then s
3




g : By a n a rgum e n t





If there is suc hab e li ef suc h tha t t
3
is a b est repl y ,w e a re don e . Othe rw i se, s
1
m ust




: Note al s o that t
2
m ustb eab e s t




: In ei ther case w e can re pe a t the construction fro m the previ ou s






g whic hc on c ludes the a rgum e n t. 2
4 Se lection
In the previ o us sect ion I considere d learning without exp eri m en ta ti on , m i s tak es o r m u-
tations . I sho w ed tha t from an y ini tial condition t h e dynam i cc on v e rg e sa l m ost surel y
to on e of the m ini m al-curb-sta te sets. Th e unp e rturb e d dyna m ic do es not sel ect a m on g
c u r b s e t s. W or k b yY oung [ 19 93 ] , Kando ri , Mail a th and Rob [199 3], El li so n [ 19 93 ] sh o ws
that sim il a r dynam ic s sel ect a m o ng stri ct Nas h equi li bria, pro vided they are a ugm en ted
to all o wf o r m i s tak es. Sam uelson [199 3], N￿ olde k e a nd Sa m uel so n [ 1 993 ] [199 4] in v es-
tigate sele cti on a m o ng no nsingle to n re curring com m un i cation classes. Hurk ens [19 94 ]
sho w st h a ta ni n tui tiv ec l a ss of dynam ic s whic h con v e rg e s globa l ly to curb s e ts do e s not
sel ect a m ong them o nc em istak es a re a dde d. Iw i ll sho wi nt h i s secti o n tha t adding
m i sta k es to the p opulation learning d y na m ics le a ds to sele cti on m uc h lik ei n the w orks
ci ted a b o v e. In this s e ction I wil l a ssum e that ￿
1
;￿ > 0 :
Th e k ey idea i s tha t m i s tak es m us t rem ai n tra nsi en t; i tm us t no t b e p o ssible for a
sm all n um be r o f m istak e s to prop aga te throug h the system and to i ndu c e larg e e￿ec ts .
This pro p ert y , tr ansie nc e of mistak es, is sha re db y the dyna m ic s of Ka ndori, M ai lath
and Rob, N￿ olde k e and S am uelson, etc ..
Th e m ain result of thi s secti o n reli es on a prop ert yo fM ar k o vc hains with s tationary
trans i tion pro babil iti es w hi c hw as estab l ished b yY oung [ 1 993 ] ;F rei dlin and W en tz ell
[198 4] establi sh a s i m il a r prop e rt y for a di￿eren t class of dyna m ics.
Co nsider a M ar k o vc ha i no na ￿ n i te sta te space ￿ wi th stationa ry transition pro b-18
abili t y ￿
0
: A s sum e that wit h high proba bi lit y the pro c ess foll o ws ￿
0
; but with so m e
prob abil it ya g e n ts m ak em istak es. Let the c o rre sp ond i ng noisy transiti o n proba bil it yb e
denoted b y ￿
￿
wh e re ￿ is a pa ram e ter m e a suring the o v erall lev el o f noise i n the system .
Assum e that ￿
￿
satis￿es the fo l lo wing three prop erti es:
1. ￿
￿





(￿ j￿ ) = ￿
0
(￿ j ￿ ); 8 ￿ ; ￿ 2 ￿; an d
3. ￿
￿






( ￿ j￿ ) < 1:
It i sw e ll k nown that the ￿rst pro p ert yi m pl ie s that ￿
￿
h as a uniq u e s tationary distribu-
tion, and th at this s tati o nary distributi o n descri be s the long- run b e ha vior o f the dynam i c




l e t ￿
0
￿
d e n o t e
t h e prob abil it y a ssigned to the state ￿ b y ￿
0
:
If the trans i tion f ro m ￿ to ￿ is no t i m p o ssible u nde r ￿
￿
;r ( ￿; ￿ )=r is call ed the r e sis-




;: :: ; ￿
J
denote the recurre n t com m un i cation
cl a sses of ￿
0
: F or al l i ;j ; i 6 = j; l et r
i;j
b e the least resi s tance a m o ng all dire cted pa ths
b eg i nning in ￿
i
and endi ng in ￿
j
: De￿ne a g raph G wi th v ertic es i nd e xed b y f1; 2;: : :; J g
and for eac h i ;j -p air a dire cted edge (i; j )w i th w eigh t r
ij
: A j -tre e in G i s a sp anning
subtree o f G ; i .e ., f or e v ery v e rtex i 6= j there ex ists e xa c tly one di recte d path from i to j:
T h e t o tal re sista nc eo faj -tree i s the sum o f the re si sta nc es of the direc ted e dg es in that
tree . T he least tota l resistance am ong a l l j -tree s , denoted ￿
j
; is the s to c hastic p oten ti al
o f the re curren tc om m uni cation c lass ￿
j
: Y oung pro v es the fol lo wing prop o siti on .
L et ￿
￿
b e the uniq ue stationary distr ib ution of ￿
￿
; for any ￿: Then,
1. as ￿ ! 0;￿
￿





2. ￿ is sto ch a st i c al l y stabl e (￿
0
￿
> 0) if an d onl y if ￿ is an e le ment of the r e cu r r en t
c omm u nic ation cl a ss with m in imum sto chastic p ote ntial .
Note that the learning pro c ess w ee xa m ine in thi s p ap er i s a p eri o dic a nd i rreduci ble,
as long as pla y ers ha v e no strategies whic h are ne v e rab e s t reply a gainst an yb e l ie fs ;
ev en i f there a re p l a y e rs w i th suc h strategies, the result con ti n ues to ho l d, b e cau se the19
p erturb e d pro c ess has only one r ecurren tc om m uni cation c las s. Y oun g’s pro p os i tion and
Co roll ary 2 im ply:













N; ￿ is sto chastic al ly stabl e if an d on ly if it b el ong s to a minimal- curb- s t ate
set with minimal sto ch astic p oten tial.
Al so , a m om e n t’s re ￿ecti on sh o ws tha t fo r a n yt w o states ￿ an d ￿; the re si sta nc e
r (￿; ￿ ) ; i fi ti s ￿ n i te, is e qua l to the m i nim um n um b e ro fm i s tak es nee ded to m o v e from ￿
to ￿: R ecall tha t fo r t h e dynam i c p r opo se d here t h e role o f m istak e si st oa c tiv ate c ertain
b est repl ies of pl a y e rs. The m ista k es the m sel v e s d o not m o v e the system .I f there are
su￿ci en tl ym an ym ista k es, a strategy m a y b ecom eab e st r e ply that w asn’t b efore; m ore
m i sta k es, of th e righ t kind, wi ll ac hi ev e the sa m e e￿ect.
Iw i ll dem onstra te sele ction am ong m ini m al c ur b se ts fo r a c lass of t w o- pl a y e rg a m e s.




; suc h that e ac h strategy
of e a c h pla y er is in the pro jecti on o f at l e a st o ne m ini m al curb s e t. I n th at case I will
sa y tha t the t w om i nim al c u rb sets a re exhaustiv e.






are all p ositiv e,





; co rr esp onding to the t w om ini m al curb sets, a nd the l im it stationa ry di stribution
wil l ass i gn p ositiv ew eigh to n l y to the states in t he m i nim al -c ur b -state set wi th m i ni m um
sto c ha stic p oten ti al .
In o rde r to ￿ nd o ut whic h￿
j
is se lec ted, w en e ed to calc ulate the paths of least








whenev er su ￿ ci en tl y
m an yt yp e-1 (or t yp e-2) pla y ers m ak ea m istak e a nd u se a s trategy in Q
2
: Su ￿ ci en tl y
m an ym i s tak es of the righ t kind e v e n tua l ly turn acti on s i n Q
2
in to b e s t repli es. Once the
curre n t s tate i s supp orted o n stra t eg i es fro m b oth c urb sets, the unp erturb ed com pon e n t
of the pro ce s s ta k es o v er a nd m o v es the sta te in to ei th e r one th e of the t w om ini m al-curb-





b elong s to the ba si ns of a tt ra ct ion of b o th m i nim al -c urb- state sets, i s a consequenc e
of sa m pli n g (not nec essa ri ly w i th repl ac em e n t). The least n um be ro fm i sta k es nee ded to




can b e expre s sed i n term s o f the pla y ers’ b e li efs. L et ￿
p
be p l a y er























This i s the l ea st pro babil it yp l a y e rpc a n a ttac h to the set of strategies Q
j
￿p
and sti ll ha v e
a b est reply i n Q
j
p
: F or sim pli cit y a ssum e that p o pul at i o n size s are the s am e and e qua l
to N , an d for an y real n um be r x l et [ x] b e the sm al lest in te ge r greater tha n or eq ua l to












This obs e rv at i on us e s the fact that an y s tate ￿ wi th p ositi v e su pp ort o n s trategie s from
b o th curb s e ts b el o ngs to the ba sins o f attraction o f b o th curb sets. D e ￿n e
￿
j







W i t h t h e se prel im inaries w eh a v e the fo l lo wing result:










;￿ > 0 ; then , 9￿ ￿>0 ; such that 8 0 <￿<￿ ￿ ; 9
￿





N; ￿ is st o chastic al ly stable if and on ly if ￿ 2 ￿
j
; an d ￿
j





In the case where G is a sym m etri cg a m e a nd th e t w o curb sets are s tri ct equi libri a,
the sele cti o n crite rion i n the theorem re duces to the fa m il iar ri sk dom i na nce c rite rion of
Harsa n yi and Se lten [198 8].
5 Ex am ples
Co nsi de rt h ef ol lo wing exam ple21
5,1 1, 5 0, 0
1,5 5, 1 0, 0
0,0 0, 0 2, 2
I n t h i s e x am ple t h e upp er-le ft hand curb set wil lb es e lec ted b y the p opulation learning
dynam ic . Aft er a l l bot h p l a y ers can g uara n tee the m selv es a pa y o￿ of 3 ag ainst an yb e li efs
concen tra te d on this s e tw h i c h sho ws that m or e m istak e s are nee ded to upset a state
supp orted o n this c urb set tha n a sta te where all ag e n ts use thei r thi rd strateg y . In this
ex am pl e ,as p e c i￿cati o n of the underly ing d e term inisti c pro ce ss i n Ka ndori, Mail ath and
Rob’s (KM R) [ 1 993 ] dynam i c suc h that ad j u stm en t spe e ds a re eq ua l i n b oth di m ensi on s
i n r e g i o n s w h e r e th e b asins o f attra c tion of the equi li bria o v erl ap w ould yie ld the sa m e
sel ecti on . This sho w s once m o re tha t s am pl ing w i th repl ac em e n ti sn o tan e cessary
conditi o n for sel ec tion am ong curb sets w hi c h are no t stric t equil ibri a.







; as l on g as the ya r e a l l p o siti v e . F urther m or e, the se v al ue sc a n b e di￿ere n ta c ro ss
p o pulati o ns, o r ev en w i thin a p opulation. Th us there i s a wide rang e of m ista k e-fre e
dynam ic s whic hy iel d the sam es e le ction. This is a result o f the fa c t that the bas i ns of
attra c tion o f di￿eren t curb sets o v erl ap . I n t h e abo v e exam pl e and in 2 ￿ 2-co ordination
ga m es it is the c a se tha t fr om an y sta te no t s upp o rt ed en tirel y on on e of the t w o curb
sets eithe r of the t w oc ur b sets can b e reac hed without m istak es. Th i s phenom e no n i s
already noted i n KMR’ s p ap er. They a l so poi n t out tha t there are dy na m i cs i n the t w o-
p o pulati o n sce na ri ow h i c h s atisfy their Dar w inian conditi o n, that only the b est strategy
in ap o pu l ation gro ws , y et sele ct the (2 ; 2 )-eq uili brium . This w ould b e the c a se, for
ex am pl e, i f in a re gi on wh e re the ba sins of attra c tion o v erlap the s p ee d o f a djustm e n t
to w ard one equi li br i um is m uc h faster tha n to w ard the other. Th us in th e f ra m ew ork
presen ted here sel ec tion o f and a m o ng curb sets is ob tai ne d o btaine d under a large set of
conditi o ns. Outside of this fram e w or k i td o e sm atter ho w o ne fo rm ulates the m ista k e-fre e
pro c ess and ho w exactl y o ne e m b eds th e m istak e pro cess in to it.22
Th at a dyna m ic satisfy the D arwinian co ndi tion i s no gua ran te e that curb sets will
b e s e lec ted, as the ne xt exam pl es h o ws.
5
x, x 2, 2 2, 2 2,2
2,2 5, 0 0, 5 0,0
2,2 0, 0 5, 0 0,5
2,2 0, 5 0, 0 5,0
Le t x> 2 and c l o s et o2 . Th e g am e ha s a unique e quil ibri um , with pa y o￿ v ector
(x; x ): The unique m inim a l curb set c oi ncide s with this equi li brium .
Co nsider a dyna m ic in w hi c h a gen ts f ro m t w o p o pul at i o ns are ra ndom l ym atc hed to
pla y this gam e. As they pla y , they m ak em i sta k es wi th pro babil it y ￿: When they m ak e
a m istak e , they put stric tly p o si tiv e pro babil it yo ne a c h of the ir stra te gi es. Afte re ac h
roun d of pl a y they l earn the true d i stribution of pla yi n the l a st p erio d a nd m o v et o a
b est re ply ag ainst this di stribution. I n the fr am e w ork of this pa p er, thi s corresp o nds
to the cas e of ￿
1
=1 : I ti s easily c hec k e d tha t for ￿ = 0 this Mark o v pro ce s s h as thre e
rec urren t com m unicati on c l a sses, one corresp o nding to the equi li brium , one to a cy cl ei n
whic ha g e n ts use only their last three stra te gi es, and one to a cy cle in w hi c h the pa y o￿
v ector is a l w a ys (2 ; 2):
It i s al s o easil yc he c k ed that with x close to 2 , the l im iting sta t